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MECHANISM OF MEXICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE ROLE OF DETERIORATING SOURCES OF 
GROWTH IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS 
By Robert E. Looney 
Until the last decade, Mexico was considered a major suc-
cess story among the less developed countries that have been 
attempting to modernize and industrialize since World War II. 
The results were impressive. By 1980, Mexico (1) was pro-
ducing more than 10 percent of the Third World's total manu-
facturing output, and it had become the tenth largest country 
in the world in terms of gross domestic product originating in 
manufacturing. (2) 
When expressed in dollar value, the output of industry 
exceeded that of developed countries like the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark or Norway. In absolute terms, 
the value of industrial output was about the size of Argentina's 
or India's, more than five times that of Israel's, and about 
twice that of South Korea.(3) 
These developments may explain in part why the crisis the 
Mexican economy has been going through since 1982 has 
taken the majority of Mexican ( 4) and outside observers by 
surprise. ( 5) 
The standard interpretation (6) of Mexico's current financial 
and economic problems is that it is the culmination of develop-
ments that began after the peso crisis of 1976. According to 
this line of reasoning, following the discovery of vast oil re-
sources in 19 7 7, the Mexican government embarked on free-
spending policies aimed at rapid economic development, and at 
accelerating the rise in the overall standard of living: (7) 
... year after year, expenditures exceeded revenues, 
and the government's budget showed a continually larger 
deficit. The financing requirements of the government's 
deficit added to the already booming demand for the 
country's meager supply of domestic capital resources. 
Interest rates began to rise rapidly. To moderate the 
increase and thus to keep the expansion going, the Central 
Bank accelerated its monetization of .the government's 
debt i.e., purchasing government securities issued to 
finance the debt by newlv created money. In addition to 
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'printing press' financing of its deficit, the government 
turned to foreign sources. A growing portion of the 
deficit was financed by borrowing abroad and the public 
foreign debt rose from about $8 billion in 1974 to around 
$60 billion by 1982.(8) 
By the beginning of 198 7 the country's external debt was well 
over $100 billion, with little evidence that the country had any 
coherent plan for dealing with the situation.(9) 
In general the main thrust of the orthodox interpretation of 
Mexico's current economic crisis is that the country is experi-
encing a (short run) crisis in liquidity rather than a (longer-run) 
problem of involvency. ( 10) 
Unfortunately, the liquidity crisis interpretation of recent 
trends in the Mexican economy has lead to a certain amount of 
complacency on the part, not only of government officials, but 
also of influential ( 11) observers. 
While the orthodox view of Mexico's economic problems 
undoubtedly provides valuable guidance, therefore, in the 
design of short to medium term stabilization programs, the 
country's lingering financial crisis and sub-par economic per- .• 
formance suggest that some longer term (insolvency) factors 
are as ]east as important if not more important than the shorter 
run (illiquidity) factors usually stressed. The purpose of this 
paper is therefore to propose an alternative explanation for the 
country's current economic woes, an explanation that stresses 
the longer run trends in declining total factor productivity 
experienced by the economy since World War II. 
Total Factor Productivity 
The basis of the calculations of the factors underlying the 
slow-down in Mexican economic growth is a simplified produc-
tion function along the lines suggested by Denison(12) in which 
output is expressed as a function of labor (L), capital (K), land 
(R), and a total factor productivity term (A), and the form of 
the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type; i.e., out-
put is assumed to be a function of technology, capital and labor 
with the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
assumed to be unity.(13) 
The advantage of this formulation is that its logarithmic 
form permits one to use information on observed growth of 
labor, capital, and land to derive total factor productivity, 
rP; i.e. 
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rP = rY - (arL + brK + crR) 
where rY, rL, rK and rR refer to annual proportionate rates of 
Gross Domestic Product, labor, capital and land respectively. 
The three factor inputs, land, labor and capital are weighted 
according to the constant returns to scale assumption implicit 
in the Cobb-Doublas production function; i.e., the coefficients 
with respect to each input (a, b, and c, respectively) sum to 
unity, with the coefficient presenting the respective share of 
that factor in value added. In Mexico's case, the shares of factor 
incomes during the 1960-80 period were approximately: (14) 
1. a= labor share = 0.60 
2. b = capital share= 0.35 
3. c = land rent share = 0.05 
and thus these values are used in the sources of growth compu-
tations. 
The relatively high capital share of 0.35 in Mexico during this 
period compared to that in the range of 0.25 to 0.35 usually 
found in the more advanced countries can be explained in part 
by the fact that due to the country's stage of industrialization, 
there were numerous and obvious "gaps" in the capital struc-
ture to be filled. To a considerable degree investment has 
represented efforts to fill in these gaps. In contrast countries 
with an alr;ady extensive capital structure have patterns of 
investment oriented more towards replacing and duplicating 
existing capital, hence the generally lower rate of return in 
these areas. 
Secondly, Mexico's recent import substitution policy - the 
policy of eliminating entirely the importation of certain pro-
ducts to encourage their domestic production - has also created 
gaps that in turn provided possibilities for profitable invest-
ments. The monopolistic position of many of the import 
substitution plants has often permitted the maintenance of 
prices at levels sufficient to assume relatively high returns on 
capital. In the context of the present study, it is this latter ex-
planation of Mexico's relatively high marginal product of capital 
that is particularly relevant. ( 15) 
In terms of the actual calculations of factor productivity, 
growth of output is taken from the International Monetary 
Funds's International Financial Statistics and deflated to con-
stant 1960 prices by using the wholesale price index. Growth 
of the labor force is based on the International Labor Office's 
figures for five year intervals; intervening years are derived by 
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extrapolation. The capital stock was calculated beginning with 
Reynold's(16) estimate for 1959. A hypothetical rate of 
depreciation (5 percent) was then applied and gross invest-
ment for the year (in constant prices) added in order to derive 
the capital stock (K) at the end of the year (Table 1 ). 
The figures for land are taken from Reynolds and are proba-
bly the least reliable. Land per se, however, probably has 
played a relatively minor role in the country's recent economic 
growth; the margin of error is not critical to the overall results. 
Using the assumed factor weights, the relative importance of 
direct factor inputs, together with the residual (or unexplained 
productivity) were estimated. 
The results (Table 2) confirm the general trends found in 
earlier studies and indicate that these continued into the early 
1980s: 
1. Growth in real GDP has gradually decelerated from 8.2 
percent per annum in 1960-65 to 6.8, 5.9, and 5.5 percent per 
annum for the 1965-70, 1970-75, and 1975-80 subperiods, 
respectively. 
2. The rate of capital formation continued to accelerate dur-
ing the 1960-80 period, from 3.1 percent per annum in the 
1960-65. period to 5.9, 6.8 and 7.4 percent per annum for the 
1965-70, 1970-75 and 1975-80 subperiods, respectively. 
3. Similarly, the contribution of capital to over-all growth 
has increased during this period as has that of total factor 
inputs. 
4. It follows that pure productivity growth (the unexplained 
growth factor) has continued its decline observed for earlier 
periods, falling from 5.3 percent for the 1960-65 period to 2.9, 
1.4 and 0.8 percent per annum, respectively, for the 1965-70, 
1970-75, and 1975-80 subperiods. 
5. As a result of investment expanding at a rate faster than 
GDP, its share has risen progressively since 1940. Similarly, 
the internal rate of savings has almost doubled since the 1940s. 
Still investment opportunities appear to have increasingly out-
stripped domestic savings capacity, leading to growth of foreign 
borrowing. External borrowing (imports - exports) has risen 
sharply as a share of GDP from 0.2 percent in the 1940s, to 1.8 
percent and 3.1 percent in the 19
0
60s and 1970s, respectively. 
As a share of total investment external borrowing rose from 
under 2 percent in the 1950s to 10 percent in the 1970s. This 
TABLE 1 
MEX! CO: INVESTMENT, CAPITAL, GDP AND CAPITAL OUTPUT RATIOS, 1960-1980 
Change 1 n cap1 tal Incremental Gross Gross Cal"ita1 Change 
I nvesnnent I nvPstment( 1} stock IK 1 in capital Gross Gross Domestic Output capital-Output 
(Billions of (Billions of (Bi 11 ions of Stock Domestic Product Ratio Ratio 
Current PP SOS) 1960 Pesos) 1960 Pesos) (/ Y) Product (Y) ( YI (Kt-1/Yc) 
-
1959 19.6 331.1 t 
-
1960 23.2 23.2 337.8 6.7 150.5 - 2.2 0.9 
1961 24.1 23.3 344.2 6.4 157.9 7.4 2.1 0.9 3.1 
1 %2 24.8 23.3 350.3 6.1 165.3 7.4 2.1 0.5 3.1 
1963 32.6 29.7 362.5 12.2 178.5 13.2 2.0 0.6 1.8 
1964 41.0 35.4 37«l.8 17.3 199.4 20.9 1.8 1.3 1.4 
1965 44.2 37 .?. 398.0 18.2 212.3 12.9 1.8 1.2 2.7 
1966 50.2 40.7 418.8 20.8 227.0 14.7 1.8 1.5 2.5 
1067 59.6 46.Q 444.8 26.0 241.3 14.3 1.7 1.3 2.8 
1 '!68 65.7 50.1; 473.1 28.3 260.9 19.6 1.7 1.7 2.4 
1060 72.P 53.9 503.4 30.3 277 .4 16.5 1.7 1.6 3.1 
1970 82.3 5P.3 536.5 33.l 296.6 19.2 1.7 3.2 2.8 
l«l71 81.6 55.4 565.1 28.6 306.8 10.2 1.7 1.3 5.7 
1972 QJ.8 62.8 500.6 34.5 329.l 22.3 !. 7 1.4 2.5 
1973 J?E.4 72.2 641.8 42.2 354.1 25.0 1.7 1.4 2.5 
1974 173.1' 8(1.0 689.7 47.9 375.0 20.9 1. 7 2.0 3.5 
l 'l75• 231;.fi 91.9 747.1 57.4 393.0 18.0 1.8 2.7 4.4 
1976 2811.4 92.0 !!OJ .7 54.6 401.4 8.4 1.9 6.8 10.9 
1977 363.3 82.l R43.7 42.0 414.5 13.0 1.9 4.2 7.1 
197P 494.~ 91'.2 897.7 54.0 444.7 30.2 1.9 1.4 2.7 
1970 71B.4 118.6 971.4 73.7 480.2 35.5 1.9 1.5 2.7 
1080 1032.9 13F.9 1059.7 88.3 520.2 40.0 1.9 1.!l 3.0 
SOURCEt: Gross lnvPstment, Gross D0111es~oduct, computed from data 1n-Tnternat1onal Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics; Capital Stock 1959 fiourP, Clark Reynolds, A Shift-S~are Analysis of Regional and Sector1al Product1v1ty 
Growth 1n Contl'mporary M~xico (Laxenburo, Austria: International lnstitute-ror Applied Systems Analysis, 1980. 
NOTE: Capital stock 1960-80 computed for each year by using a depreciation rate of 5 pPrcent to rrevious year's capital 
stor.k and adding t~P current year's gross investment. 
TABLE 2 
MEXICO: SOURCES OF GROWJ"H, 1960 - 198(l 
--"Avera<le Annllal 
Rate o~·Growth (I) Contribution to GDP Growth (I) 
Year GDP l'.afital [a6or rana ! r.aEnai [a6or [an<I Inputs OnexEh'lieO 
960 13.4 2.0 2.6 3.2 0.7 1.6 0.2 2.5 10.9 
1961 4.9 1.9 2.6 3.2 0.7 1.6 0.2 2.5 2.4 
1962 4.7 LB 2.6 3.2 0.6 1.6 0.2 2.4 2.3 
1963 8.0 3.5 2.6 3.2 1.2 1.6 0.2 3.0 5.0 
1964 11.7 4.8 2.6 3.2 1.7 1.6 0.2 3.5 8.2 
1965 6.5 4.8 2.6 -0.5 1. 7 1.6 
-
3.3 3.2 
1966 6.9 5.2 3.0 -0.5 1.8 1.8 
-
3.6 3.3 
1967 6.3 6.2 3.0 -0.5 2.2 1.8 - 4.0 2.3 
1968 8.1 6.4 3.0 -0.5 2.2 1.8 
-
4.0 4.1 
1969 6.3 6.4 3.0 -0.5 2.3 1.8 
-
4.1 2.2 
1970 6.9 6.6 3.0 2.0 2.3 1.8 0.1 4.1 2.8 
1971 3.5 5.3 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 0.1 4.0 -0.5 
1972 7.3 6.1 3.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 0.1 4.2 3.1 
1973 7.6 7.0 3.3 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.1 4.6 3.0 
1974 • 5.9 7.5 3.3 2.0 2.6 2.0 0.1 4.7 1.2 
1975 4.1 8.3 3.3 2.0 2.9 2.0 0.1 5.0 -0.9 
1976 2.1 7.3 3.3 2.0 2.6 2.0 0.1 4.7 -2.6 
1977 3.3 5.? 3.3 2.0 1.8 2.0 0.1 3.9 -0.6 
1978 7.3 6.4 3.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 0.1 4.3 3.0 
1979 8.0 8.2 3.3 2.0 2.9 2.0 0.1 5.0 3.0 
1980 8.3 9.1 3.3 2.0 3.2 2.0 0.1 5.3 3.0 
1960-65 8.2 3.1 2.6 2.6 1.1 1.6 0.2 2.9 5.3 
1965-70 6.8 5.9 2.9 -0.1 2.1 1.8 - 3.9 2.9 
1970-75 5.9 6.8 3.3 2.0 2.4 2.0 0.1 4.5 1.4 
1975-80 5.5 7.4 3.3 2.0 2.6 2.0 0.1 4.7 0.8 
SOUR CE: Ciiiiijliite<!Trom data 1 n: GDP, Inves'brient, Internat1ona1 Monetary Fund, Internationai Financ1al Stat1stics; [a6or 
Internationa' Labor Office, Labor Force 1950-200 Volume Ill, Latin Ame"Flca (Geneva, 1977); Land, C1arl<lleynold, A 
Shift-Share Analysis of Regional and Sectorial Productivity Growth in Contemporary Mexico (Laxenburg. Austria) 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1980); Capital, Table 
NOTE: Following Reynolds (above reference), the weights used for computing capital's labor's and land's contribution to 
growth wre 0.35 and 0.05 respectively. 
naE3 
PROXIMATE SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE 
MEXICAN ECONOMY, 1940-1975 
(Average Annual Growth) . 
~~~---~~19~4~0~-~~M19~5-o--~--,1~9~6~0-~~~1~9~60r-~~-..1~96"5--~~-...1~9_,..70-
l'utput 
(1) Gross Domestic Product 
Input 
(2) Man-years of Labor (3) capital Stock . 
(4) Hectares of Land in Cultivation 
(5) Rate of Growth attributable to 
Direct Factor Inputs 
( 2 - 4 above l 
(6} Rate of Growth Unexplained by 
above Inputs 
50 60 70 65 70 75 
f'. 
5.8 5.9 6.8 6.9 6.7 5.5 
3.5 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 
2.8 5.5 6.0 5.3 6.7 6.7 
3.6 1.0 2.1 3.2 -0.5 2.0 
3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.9 
2.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.9 1.6 
SOURCE: Clark W. Reynolds, A Shift-Share Analysis of Regional and Sectoral Prorluctivity Growth in Contemporary Mexico 
(Laxenburg, Austria:--International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1980), p. 6. 
TABLE 4 
MEX! CO: SOURCES OF GROlo'TH, 1970 - 1964 
AveraQe Annual Growth (i) 
GDP • capital Lahor 
contribution t06rowtll9TI 























SOURCE: Henry J. Bruton, "Productivity Growth in Latin America," American Economic Review 





NOTE: Capital and labor rates of growth are weighted by (0.50) eac~ to derive their contribution 
to the rate of growth of gross domestic product. 
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is consistent with the decline in net productivity growth and 
implies that the domestic surplus available for savings and 
investment is expanding at a lower rate (thus forcing increased 
dependence on foreign borrowing and foreign direct invest-
ment). 
These trends obviously reflect the higher growth rates of 
labor and capital in recent years. The slow-down in productivity 
is especially serious since the capacity of the market to transmit 
productivity gains from leading to lagging sectors depends on 
net productivity growth. The results also suggest that the 
Mexican economy may have reached a watershed in the early 
1960s such that the previous pattern of development is now 
giving way to a new set of structural forces which imply slower 
output growth per unit of input. 
Since this process of deceleration has been occurring simul-
taneously with pressures mounting for: 1) wage increases; 
2) greater social outlays; 3) more equitable agrarian policies; 
and 4) other reform measures, an alleviation of the factors 
underlying the decline in productivity growth is especially 
critical. Similarly, the acceleration in demographic growth and 
urbanization in recent decades makes it imperative that the 
economy incre_ilse its ability to absorb new entrants into the 
work force. 
Reynolds ( 1 7) found (Table 3) productivity gains at the 
national level rising steadily from the 1940s through the mid-
1950s, only to level off in the mid-1950s, finally reaching a 
high of 3.4 perccent per annum in the period 1960-65, falling 
to 2.9 percent per annum in the second half of the decade, 
and further declining to 1.6 percent per annum in the 1970-75 
period. 
The study by Henry Bruton(18) indicates (Table 4) that 
productivity growth not caused by increases in the productive 
factors of labor and capital amounted to 6. 7 5 percent a year in 
1940-45, 1.25 percent in 1946-54, 2.05 percent in 1955 percent 
in the 1955-59, and 2.85 percent for 1960-64. According to 
Bruton, all of Latin America including Mexico to a lesser 
extent, has experienced a reduction in the rate of production 
increase not attributable to the increase in capital and labor 
productive factors as a result of the ineffic;iency of the process 
of "forced" industrialization initiated by these countries. 
In contrast during this period both Europe and the United 
States, experienced a very high percentage of production incre-
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ment produced by increases in productive factors. In Latin 
America this percentage was very small. In other words, that 
growth attributable to technological or radical change in limited 
and has been declining, since the Latin American countries 
through their process of import substitution industrialization, 
have been unable to develop the economies of scale and other 
types that could be expected under other conditions of the 
growth process. It should be noted that Bruton assumes a func-
tional distribution of production amounting to 50 percent for 
the capital factor and 50 percent for labor. He omits changes 
in the area cultivated as a productive factor. 
In an earlier work, Clark Reynolds(19) makes the same 
calculations for 1940-50 and 1950-60. For the first period he 
estimates an increment of 3.3 percent a year in the product 
not attributable to increases in capital and labor factors. For 
1950-60, growth not resulting from these productive factors 
drops to 2.5 percent of the product. 
Although Reynolds differs somewhat from Bruton methodo-
logically, his adherence to Bruton's hypothesis is implicit in 
his work. Furthermore, Reynolds estimates "social accounting 
equations" of the Denison type for farm and industrial sectors 
and c~mcludes that in the agricultural sector the percentage of 
product growth rate not accounted for by increase in produc-
tive factors is comparatively much higher than in the industrial 
sector. Accordingly, during· 1940-50, only 0.2 percent of sec-
toral growth in the industrial sector can be attributed to fac-
tors other than labor and capital, while for 1950-60 only 0. 7 
percent is attributable to these causes. This compares with a 
growth for the same periods of about 1.2 and 1.9 percent in 
agriculture. 
In other words the calculations of Professor Reynolds imply 
that production factors are more profitable or generate a rela-
tively higher percentage of technological or residual change in 
the farm sector than in the manufacturing sector. Seen from 
one standpoint, Bruton and Reynolds coincide in explaining 
product growth in Mexico along similar lines. They both believe 
that the productivity of productive factors is much higher in the 
farm sector than in industry. 
The third study, that undertaken by Marcello Selowsky,(20) 
includes adjustment of the labot force for improvement of edu-
cation. He indicates that improvement in education tends to 
increase steadily its weight as a factor in economic growth. In 
THE MECHANISM OF MEXICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 87 
1945-50, improvement in education, accounted for only 0.1 
percent of the annual growth rate. Subsequently in 1950-55, it 
accounted for 0.21 percent a year, in 1955-59 for 0.20 percent, 
and in 1960-64 for 0.51 percent. In other words improvement 
in education tended to become increasingly important as a 
component of economic growth. 
It is also of interest to note that once the necessary adjust-
ments have been made, the product remainder tends to dimin-
ish. Accordingly, the 1940-45 remainder accounted for 5.92 
percent out of a growth rate of 7 .3 7 percent. In 1945-50 it 
represented 2.18 percent out of 5.84 percent, and finally in 
1960-64 out of a rate of 6.22 percent for the gross domestic 
product, the remainder came to only 1.4 7. This tends to con-
firm the explicit Bruton and implicit Reynolds hypothesis and 
the one developed here, that basic inputs are being used in an 
increasingly less profitable manner as a result of their diversion 
from agriculture to industry. 
This interpretation is consistent with the country's agricul-
tural policy of attempting to turn the terms of trade against 
agriculture in order to maintain low food prices in urban areas. 
The economic outcomes of these policies for the agricultural 
sector have resulted in: (21) 
1. State controls on the prices of food staples, like 
maize, beans, and (to a lesser extc;nt) wheat, have made 
them unattractive to commercial farmers thus depressing 
the production of these crops in the capitalist sector; 
2. These same disincentives also affect production in 
the peasant sector; small farmers attempt to produce 
enough of these crops for their own needs but have little 
interest in producing substantial surplus for sale. Small 
farmers increasingly become marginalized. 
3. Private investment in the agricultural sector has thus 
tended to be in those 'luxury' commodities that will bring 
high prices in the international and national markets, thus 
earning substantial proficts for their producers. 
4. Public investment has also been biased toward pro-
ducing infrastructure and subsidies for the larger producers 
who are thought to be most capable of providing surpluses 
of agricultural staples and producing export commodities. 
The net result has been an increasing inability on the part of 
the agricultural sector to productively employ the growing labor 
force. 
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Along these lines, several possible explanations are consistent 
with the results obtained in the current study. Clearly, the 
acceleration in the size of the labor force may have begun to 
place a significant drag on productivity growth. This could have 
occurred as early as the mid-1960s as the supply of available 
workers began to outstrip demand growth, thus causing labor 
productivity growth to fall. Coale (22) has hypothesized that 
the acceleration in population growth beginning around 1940 
eventually led to a lower rate of productivity growth and 
social progress than would have been achieved under more 
moderate demographic conditions. Through detailed shift 
share analysis Reynolds has provided additional evidence to 
support this view.(23) 
Another hypothesis, while acknowledging the influence of 
rapid growth on productivity, stresses the role of government 
policy in contributing to the decline in productivity. The 
development policies which created the profitable opportuni-
ties for investment (especially in the years after 1955) also 
created conditions that: 
5. made it extremely difficult for technological reasons 
to achieve as high a rate of productive increase; and 
6. created an economic environment in which Mexican 
entrepreneurs had little incentive to search for productiv-
ity increasing improvements. 
More specifically, it is argued that during the 1940-45 period 
(the war years) both technological and incentive factors worked 
in favor of a relatively high growth in productivity. In particular 
World War II provided projects without distortion (due to 
unavailability of consumer goods imports from the advanced 
countries), while the import substitution approach to develop-
ment has provided protection, it has also imposed severe dis-
tortions, and it is these distortions that create the two effects 
ou dined above. ( 2 4) 
Of particular relevance is the fact noted above that in the 
1940-45 period the growth of capital was much lower than in 
later periods (due largely to the curtailment of imported capital 
goods). During the 1940-45 period, there existed a strong and 
obvious demand in both the internal markets and for exports. 
Consequently, then~ was simultaneously great incentive for 
firms to increase output, but ah inability on their part to 
obtain new plant equipment, and spare parts and replace-
ments. 
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The flow of many raw material imports was also irregular 
and unpredictable during the 1940-45 period. With foreign 
supplies of capital equipment difficult to obtain, firms (to take 
advantage of favorable markets) were forced to find ways to 
use their existing capital stock with increasing effectiveness. 
Improvisation and adaptation of existing equipment were 
common, and one can find many examples in Mexican industry 
during this period of indigenously devised machines producing 
various items for household and business use. 
World War II then not only provided "protection" from 
foreign competition, but more importantly helped to create an 
environment within which Mexican entrepreneurs had incen-
tives to utilize resources at hand with increasing effectiveness. 
The innovative activity observed in Mexican industry during 
this period included not only changes in technique to fit the 
domestic supply of inputs complementary to capital (labor of 
various skills and quality, raw material imports, and managerial 
ability) but also the adaptation to techniques to fit the coun-
try's market size and of products to fit the nation's unique 
profile of demand. 
Although the growth of the labor supply was not thwarted 
the way capital inputs were, the wartime isolation had some 
effect on laboio1s use. 
1. One of the consequences of the efforts to use physi-
cal capital more effectively was , the adaptation of local 
tools and equipment to fit the quality of the available 
labor. 
2. Thus Mexico's capital stock became increasingly 
appropriate to the country's relative factor endowments 
(thereby raising its productivity). 
3. Strong and obvious demand in a situation where 
availability of new imported capital was recognized to be 
almost nil forced entrepreneurs to strive for a relatively 
high degree of productivity. 
The wartime experience is most clearly contrasted with the 
post-1955 period. In this latter period, a large segment of the 
domestic economy was again isolated from foreign competition, 
but this time by high tariffs and other forms of import impedi-
ments, particularly a stringent system of import licensing. 
As the war has created profitable opportunities for increased 
output of a wide range of manufactured goods, so also the 
government's strategy of import substitution created a much 
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different environment for industrialization than periods of 
relatively free trade ( 1945-55) or the war years ( 1940-45 ). 
The response to the opportunities that produced high rates 
of productivity increase during the war years seems to be absent 
in later years. In comparing the later periods with the war 
period, three characteristics seem to be especially relevant. 
1. The most obvious difference has to do with the supply 
conditions of imported capital goods. As noted, capital goods 
imports were virtually unavailable during the 1940-45 period. 
After 1955, the almost universal and continuous overvaluation 
of the peso made capital imports cheap relative to domestic 
inputs. Mexican entrepreneurs not only knew that foreign-
made capital was available, but had a major incentive to u~e it 
intensively in their production. Based on a number of studies 
of developed and developing countries, there is no real firm 
evidence that capital formation tends to incorporate the sources 
of productivity growth. On the labor side, a variety of social 
welfare policies in the 1960s, and especially 1970s and early 
1980s, added to the cost of employing labor. (25) 
There is no doubt that prevailing market prices for capital 
and labor reflected the real factor supply situation much 
more accurately in the 1940-45 period than they did in the 
later ~riods. In a very general sense, it seems correct to say 
than the capital equipment imported from and designed for 
capital rich labor scarce countries was more nearly appropriate 
(for the individual producer)' in its unmodified state, than was 
the case in the war years. 
In this sense, Mexican entrepreneurs had less incentive to 
modify or adapt (and thereby raise the productivity of) their 
imported capital than they had in the earlier period. Indeed 
their incentives worked in the opposite direction: they were 
encouraged to meet any demands for increased output by 
acquiring more capital from abroad. It is important to empha-
size that the misleading factor prices arose largely from specific 
policy measures, not from some endemic characteristic of the 
economy. Similary note should be taken of the fact that "entre-
preneural response" did not change; i.e., entrepreneurs reacted 
to market signals from both periods with considerable rational-
ity. 
2. Another difference betwee:q the 1940-45 and later ( espe-
cially the post-1965) period has to do with the composition of 
output. Although industrialization was underway in Mexico 
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before 1940, it was not until the 1950s that an explicit import 
substitution policy of industrialization was effective. In the 
present context the most relevant characteristic of this policy 
is the haphazard and ad hoc manner in which trade barriers 
were applied. There is no evidence of a careful review leading 
to the protection of individual industries or activities on the 
basis of expected productivity growth or infant industry con-
siderations. Rather import limitations were initiated largely 
either: 
1. to mediate balance of payments difficulties; or 
2. in response to pressure from specific interests 
wishing to expand into new activities. 
The result of such a policy has been not only a reduction in 
current income in accordance with the conventional free trade 
model (perhaps directly accounting for the continuous deceler-
ation in overall growth throughout the 1960 period) but more 
importantly the creation of an industrial structure that is quite 
incapable of creating a significant number of new jobs due to 
the capital intensive nature of capital goods import. Further-
more, as profit rates on invested capital (even with considerable 
underutilization) remained high, gaps offered opportunities for 
further investment. As foreign loans have become easily obtain-
able and are t'l.sually taken for increasing capacity rather than 
for utilizing existing capacity, the rate of growth of capital has 
produced rising prices rather than rising productivity. 
In this regard several observers see some hope in the so-called 
"new technologies."(26) For example Bueno(27) notes that: 
Since Mexico has reached a certain level of techno-
logical development, its policy should be less concerned 
with the selection and negotiation of technology transfer. 
Instead the country should focus on the questions of 
adaptation, absorption and diffusion of technologies 
imported from abroad. As in the case of the import sub-
stitution process, the 'simple' stage of technology transfer 
is over and the country is entering into a new and more 
complex stage. · 
Clearly the results above indicate that had this strategy been 
adopted beginning in the early 1970s the severity of the current 
economic crisis could have been significantly lessened. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the observed changes m the rate of growth of pro-
92 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
ductivity in Mexico have shown a continuous deceleration 
due to: 
1. a growing inappropriateness of the input mix of 
production caused in large part to the continued under-
valuation of foreign exchange in relation to interest and 
wage rates; 
2. a growing inappropriateness of the composition of 
output in the sense that production was not based on 
cost or potential cost considerations, but rather evolved in 
response to the incentives generated by government 
policies; 
3. declining competition; and 
4. rapid increases in the number of workers entering 
the labor force. 
The net result of these longer run trends has been the build 
up of a series of pressures . During thel 960s the country was 
still able to sustain a high growth rate and a considerable degree 
of internal and external stability. In the 19 70s and 1980s, how-
ever, the rate of growth fluctuated greatly and has decelerated 
considerably over this period. Clearly the decline in total factor 
productivity has made it increasingly difficult for the country 
to achieve a suitable equation between growth, employment 
and the balance of payments. Until Mexico is able to revive the 
s01.uces of growth responsible for expansion in the 1950s and 
1960s, it will be unable to achieve the rate of economic expan-
sion necessary to enable it 'to deal with its many social and 
political problems. 
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